"Aujourd’hui, la plupart des solutions Web 2.0 mises en place dans les grandes entreprises sont dans une impasse ou en voie de l’être.
Personne n’en parle, ni l’acheteur, ni le vendeur, parce que l’échec est sans conséquence. Le logiciel est mis en place et après quelques mois plus personne ne l’utilise à l’exception de quelques
« déviants » (j’en fais partie !) que j’appelle des « ambassadeurs de l’intelligence collective » ou « créatif culturel ». Il faut espérer qu’un jour, leur rôle soit reconnu et valorisé. Mais,
avec ou sans déviants, l’échec passe inaperçu parce qu’un logiciel que personne n’utilise, ça ne fait pas de bruit et ça ne dérange personne. L’organisation continue à fonctionner comme avant et
tout le monde est conten
Ce que Olivier Zara explique ici, c'est que l'utilisation des outils 2.0 en Entreprise ne peut fonctionner que :
- s'ils répondent à de réels besoins quotidiens et métiers.
- s'ils sont accompagnés par des mesures de changement de la culture et d'accompagnement
Si l'échec de ce type de projets est "sans conséquence", et cela doit être le cas effectivement pour un grand nombre d'entre eux, n'est-ce pas le signe :
- que l'organisation a été trop timide dans sa démarche ?
- qu'elle a précisément choisi un projet où le besoin n'était pas assez fort pour être critique en cas d'échec ?
Les outils "2.0" recouvrent un certain nombre de solutions telles que les flux RSS, les Tags (taxonomies et/ou folksonomies), les blogs, les
wikis, les commentaires, les votes, les réseaux sociaux,... Tous n'imposent pas les mêmes contraintes en terme de mise en oeuvre, d'accompagnement, de gestion du changement.
Dans un article récent intéressant, Olivier Zara, consultant très connu pour ses publications sur l'Intelligence collective, semble pessimiste sur la mise en oeuvre des solutions issues du web 2.0 dans l'Entreprise.
Il y a une véritable conduite du changement à mener et tout ne peut pas changer en un jour. Il s’agit de trouver vos champions qui vont apporter leur énergie au projet et vous aider à faire changer les choses.
Même s’il ne faut pas sous-estimer le potentiel d’une expérience lancé dans un service ou une direction et qui finit par faire tâche d’huile dans l’ensemble de l’entreprise. Mais dans ce cas encore, cet élargissement n’a été possible que par l’intermédiaire d’un sponsor haut placé qui a été convaincu par le projet. De fait, plutôt qu’opposer top-down et bottom-up autant trouver comment ces initiatives vont se compléter afin de donner de meilleurs résultats et produire des « guidelines » concrètes.
l faut un accompagnement et ce ne sont pas les outils qui sont déterminants, mais les modes de management qui y sont liés. Il faut laisser le temps aux collaborateurs de comprendre ce qu’on attend d’eux et qu’ils identifient les gains potentiels pour eux. Le deuxième point est la frilosité et le refus de prendre un petit risque pour introduire ces nouveaux modes de fonctionnement.
Des exemples comme ceux de Lockheed Martin, une société mondiale dans le secteur de l’aérospatiale et de la défense, montrent que malgré tout on peut basculer vers l’entreprise 2.0 (pourtant la question de la sécurité et du secret est au coeur de son business model). Ils ont eu la garantie qu’en cas de problème il pourrait identifier d’où cela proviendrait (pour le moment cela n’a jamais été le cas).
Il conclue enfin sur la question récurrente du ROI. Il ne s’agit pas de mesurer de nouveaux process avec d’anciennes recettes. Il s’agit plutôt d’identifier ses besoins et enjeux et voir si ces technologies peuvent y répondre.
Relative advantage : what value does it bring ?
Compatibility : how much effort to transition to this innovation ?
Complexity : how much learning is required to apply it ?
Triability : How easy is it to try the innovation ?
Observability : How visible are the results ?
None of these intangible assets (human, organizational and informational capital – i.e databases, Information systems, networks, technology infrastructure) has value that can be measured separately or independently.
Mc Afee still recommend to build some kind of business case with the following elements
People make relative evaluations
Reference point is status quo
People are loss-adverse : a prospective loss of X is 3 times more painful that a gain of X is pleasurable.
These elements lead to the fact that we value what we have far more highly that what we could have instead. The result is what Gourville calls the 9x effect : people rate what they have 3 times more than their actual value and prospective items three times less than what they’re actually worth. A new item must therefore be at least 9 times better to justify the (perceived) effort required for the adoption.
As a result, McAfee quotes Gourville and recommends not to oversell the collaborative platform and make it clear that the adoption will be a long phase.
The objectives is to help them realize that these tools are the root cause of many of their daily work frustrations
So a 30 days trial might not be enough to see the full benefits of such solutions. However it can still proves how easy it is to use them.
A good strategy to make the results visible is to locate some teams of social networks enthusiasts (IT or HR departments might be a first good guess). And start to deploy the solution on such narrow teams.
In a transparency and observability purpose, it might be a good idea to monitor the knowledge workers perceived value of their tools and measure the progress. Preparing a questionnaire with a set of questions around the subject of collaboration, innovation, productivity and knowledge management could be a good starting point.
The spy agencies were saddled with technology that might have seemed cutting edge in 1995.
Theoretically, the intelligence world ought to revolve around information sharing. If F.B.I. agents discover that Al Qaeda fund-raising is going on in Brooklyn, C.I.A. agents in Europe ought to be able to know that instantly.
Writing reports was thus a leisurely affair, taking weeks or months; thousands of copies were printed up and distributed via interoffice mail. If an analyst’s report impressed his superiors, they’d pass it on to their superiors, and they to theirs — until, if the analyst was very lucky, it landed eventually in the president’s inner circle.
When the Orange Revolution erupted in Ukraine in late 2004, Burton went to Technorati, a search engine that scours the “blogosphere,” to find the most authoritative blog postings on the subject. Within minutes, he had found sites with insightful commentary from American expatriates who were talking to locals in Kiev and on-the-fly debates among political analysts over what it meant. Because he and his fellow spies were stuck with outdated technology, they had no comparable way to cooperate — to find colleagues with common interests and brainstorm online.
Indeed, throughout the intelligence community, spies are beginning to wonder why their technology has fallen so far behind — and talk among themselves about how to catch up. Some of the country’s most senior intelligence thinkers have joined the discussion, and surprisingly, many of them believe the answer may lie in the interactive tools the world’s teenagers are using to pass around YouTube videos and bicker online about their favorite bands.
perhaps, they argue, it’ s time to try something radically different. Could blogs and wikis prevent the next 9/11?
during the cold war, threats formed slowly. The Soviet Union was a ponderous bureaucracy that moved at the glacial speed of the five-year plan. Analysts studied the emergence of new tanks and missiles, pieces of hardware that took years to develop.
Analysts also did not worry about anything other than their corners of the world.
The F.B.I. terminals were connected to one another — but not to the computers at any other agency, and vice versa.
If an analyst requested information from another agency, that request traveled through elaborate formal channels. The walls between the agencies were partly a matter of law.
Islamist terrorists, as 9/11 proved, behaved utterly unlike the Soviet Union. They were rapid-moving, transnational and cellular.
To disrupt these new plots, some intelligence officials concluded, American agents and analysts would need to cooperate just as fluidly — trading tips quickly among agents and agencies. Following the usual chain of command could be fatal. “To fight a network like Al Qaeda, you need to behave like a network,” John Arquilla,
What most impressed Andrus was Wikipedia’s self-governing nature. No central editor decreed what subjects would be covered. Individuals simply wrote pages on subjects that interested them — and then like-minded readers would add new facts or fix errors.
Spies, Andrus theorized, could take advantage of these rapid, self-organizing effects. If analysts and agents were encouraged to post personal blogs and wikis on Intelink — linking to their favorite analyst reports or the news bulletins they considered important — then mob intelligence would take over.
Pieces of intel would receive attention merely because other analysts found them interesting. This grass-roots process, Andrus argued, suited the modern intelligence challenge of sifting through thousands of disparate clues: if a fact or observation struck a chord with enough analysts, it would snowball into popularity, no matter what their supervisors thought.
This control over the flow of information, as the 9/11 Commission noted in its final report, was a crucial reason American intelligence agencies failed to prevent those attacks. All the clues were there — Al Qaeda associates studying aviation in Arizona, the flight student Zacarias Moussaoui arrested in Minnesota, surveillance of a Qaeda plotting session in Malaysia — but none of the agents knew about the existence of the other evidence. The report concluded that the agencies failed to “connect the dots.”
He pointed out that the best Internet search engines, including Google, all use “link analysis” to measure the authority of documents.
Each agency had databases to amass intelligence, but because of the air gap, other agencies could not easily search them. The divisions were partly because of turf battles and partly because of legal restrictions — but they were also technological.
This, Burton pointed out, is precisely the problem with Intelink. It has no links, no social information to help sort out which intel is significant and which isn’t. When an analyst’s report is posted online, it does not include links to other reports, even ones it cites.
“Analytical puzzles, like terror plots, are often too piecemeal for individual brains to put together. Having our documents aware of each other would be like hooking several brains up in a line, so that each one knows what the others know, making the puzzle much easier to solve.”
With Andrus and Burton’s vision in mind, you can almost imagine how 9/11 might have played out differently. In Phoenix, the F.B.I. agent Kenneth Williams might have blogged his memo noting that Al Qaeda members were engaging in flight-training activity. The agents observing a Qaeda planning conference in Malaysia could have mentioned the attendance of a Saudi named Khalid al-Midhar; another agent might have added that he held a multi-entry American visa. The F.B.I. agents who snared Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota might have written about their arrest of a flight student with violent tendencies. Other agents and analysts who were regular readers of these blogs would have found the material interesting, linked to it, pointed out connections or perhaps entered snippets of it into a wiki page discussing this new trend of young men from the Middle East enrolling in pilot training.
“The 16 intelligence organizations of the U.S. are without peer. They are the best in the world. The trick is, are they collectively the best?”
in a system like this, as Andrus’s theory goes, the dots are inexorably drawn together. “Once the intelligence community has a robust and mature wiki and blog knowledge-sharing Web space,”
In the fall of 2005, they joined forces with C.I.A. wiki experts to build a prototype of something called Intellipedia, a wiki that any intelligence employee with classified clearance could read and contribute to.
From now on, Meyerrose said, each agency would have to build new systems using cheaper, off-the-shelf software so they all would be compatible. But bureaucratic obstacles were just a part of the problem Meyerrose faced. He was also up against something deeper in the DNA of the intelligence services. “We’ve had this ‘need to know’ culture for years,” Meyerrose said. “Well, we need to move to a ‘need to share’ philosophy.”
By the late summer, Fingar decided the Intellipedia experiment was sufficiently successful that he would embark on an even more high-profile project: using Intellipedia to produce a “national intelligence estimate” for Nigeria. An N.I.E. is an authoritative snapshot of what the intelligence community thinks about a particular state — and a guide for foreign and military policy.
But it will also, Fingar hopes, attract contributions from other intelligence employees who have expertise Fingar isn’t yet aware of — an analyst who served in the Peace Corps in Nigeria, or a staff member who has recently traveled there.
In the traditional method of producing an intelligence estimate, Fingar said, he would call every agency and ask to borrow their Africa expert for a week or two of meetings. “And they’d say: ‘Well, I only got one guy who can spell Nigeria, and he’s traveling. So you lose.’ ” In contrast, a wiki will “change the rules of who can play,” Fingar said, since far-flung analysts and agents around the world could contribute, day or night.
Intelink allows any agency to publish a Web page, or put a document or a database online, secure in the knowledge that while other agents and analysts can access it, the outside world cannot.
Rasmussen notes that though there is often strong disagreement and debate on Intellipedia, it has not yet succumbed to the sort of vandalism that often plagues Wikipedia pages, including the posting of outright lies. This is partly because, unlike with Wikipedia, Intellipedia contributors are not anonymous. Whatever an analyst writes on Intellipedia can be traced to him. “If you demonstrate you’ve got something to contribute, hey, the expectation is you’re a valued member,” Fingar said. “You demonstrate you’re an idiot, that becomes known, too.”
So why hasn’t Intelink given young analysts instant access to all secrets from every agency? Because each agency’s databases, and the messages flowing through their internal pipelines, are not automatically put onto Intelink. Agency supervisors must actively decide what data they will publish on the network — and their levels of openness vary.
It would focus on spotting and predicting possible avian-flu outbreaks and function as part of a larger portal on the subject to collect information from hundreds of sources around the world, inside and outside of the intelligence agencies.
Operational information — like details of a current covert action — is rarely posted, usually because supervisors fear that a leak could jeopardize a delicate mission.
“See, these people would never have been talking before, and we certainly wouldn’t have heard about it if they did,” the assistant said. By September, the site had become so loaded with information and discussion that Rear Adm. Arthur Lawrence, a top official in the health department, told Meyerrose it had become the government’s most crucial resource on avian flu.
Intelink has grown to the point that it contains thousands of agency sites and several hundred databases. Analysts at the various agencies generate 50,000 official reports a year, many of which are posted to the network. The volume of material online is such that analysts now face a new problem: data overload. Even if they suspect good information might exist on Intelink, it is often impossible to find it. The system is poorly indexed, and its internal search tools perform like the pre-Google search engines of the ’90s.“
But Meyerrose insists that the future of spying will be revolutionized as much by these small-bore projects as by billion-dollar high-tech systems. Indeed, he says that overly ambitious projects often result in expensive disasters, the way the F.B.I.’s $170 million attempt to overhaul its case-handling software died in 2005 after the software became so complex that the F.B.I. despaired of ever fixing the bugs and shelved it. In contrast, the blog software took only a day or two to get running. “We need to think big, start small and scale fast,” Meyerrose said.
But the agency’s officials trained only small groups of perhaps five analysts a month. After they finished their training, those analysts would go online, excited, and start their blogs. But they’d quickly realize no one else was reading their posts aside from the four other people they’d gone through the training with. They’d get bored and quit blogging, just as the next trainees came online.
This presents a secrecy paradox. The Unclassified Intellipedia will have the biggest readership and thus will grow the most rapidly; but if it’s devoid of truly sensitive secrets, will it be of any use?
Many in the intelligence agencies suspect not. Indeed, they often refuse to input sensitive intel into their own private, secure databases; they do not trust even their own colleagues, inside their own agencies, to keep their secrets safe.
These are legitimate concerns. After the F.B.I. agent Robert Hanssen was arrested for selling the identities of undercover agents to Russia, it turned out he had found their names by trawling through records on the case-support system.
“When you have a source, you go to extraordinary lengths to protect their identities,” I. C. Smith, a 25-year veteran of the bureau, told me. “So agents never trusted the system, and rightly so.”
What the agencies needed was a way to take the thousands of disparate, unorganized pieces of intel they generate every day and somehow divine which are the most important.
A spy blogosphere, even carefully secured against intruders, might be fundamentally incompatible with the goal of keeping secrets. And the converse is also true: blogs and wikis are unlikely to thrive in an environment where people are guarded about sharing information. Social software doesn’t work if people aren’t social.
the C.I.A. set up a competition, later taken over by the D.N.I., called the Galileo Awards: any employee at any intelligence agency could submit an essay describing a new idea to improve information sharing, and the best ones would win a prize.
The first essay selected was by Calvin Andrus, chief technology officer of the Center for Mission Innovation at the C.I.A. In his essay, “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community,”
The chat room was unencrypted and unsecured, so anyone could drop in and read the postings or mouth off. That way, Meyerrose figured, he’d be more likely to get drop-ins by engineers from small, scrappy start-up software firms who might have brilliant ideas but no other way to get an audience with intelligence chiefs. The chat room provoked howls of outrage. “People were like, ‘Hold it, can’t the Chinese and North Koreans listen in?’ ” Meyerrose told me. “And, sure, they could. But we weren’t going to be discussing state secrets. And the benefits of openness outweigh the risks.”
Indeed, Meyerrose’s office is building three completely separate versions of Intellipedia for each of the three levels of secrecy: Top Secret, Secret and Unclassified. Each will be placed on a data network configured so that only people with the correct level of clearance can see them — and these networks are tightly controlled, so sensitive information typed into the Top Secret Intellipedia cannot accidentally leak into the Unclassified one.
For the intelligence agencies to benefit from “social software,” he said, they need to persuade thousands of employees to begin blogging and creating wikis all at once. And that requires a cultural sea change: persuading analysts, who for years have survived by holding their cards tightly to their chests, to begin openly showing their hands online.
Un point essentiel. Il faut commencer petit technologiquement et grand humainement!
Fingar says that more value can be generated by analysts sharing bits of “open source” information — the nonclassified material in the broad world, like foreign newspapers, newsletters and blogs. It used to be that on-the-ground spies were the only ones who knew what was going on in a foreign country. But now the average citizen sitting in her living room can peer into the debates, news and lives of people in Iran. “If you want to know what the terrorists’ long-term plans are, the best thing is to read their propaganda — the stuff out there on the Internet,”
Beat cops in Indiana might be as likely to uncover evidence of a terror plot as undercover C.I.A. agents in Pakistan. Fiery sermons printed on pamphlets in the U.K. might be the most valuable tool in figuring out who’s raising money for a possible future London bombing. The most valuable spy system is one that can quickly assemble disparate pieces that are already lying around — information gathered by doctors, aid workers, police officers or security guards at corporations.
The premise of spy-blogging is that a million connected amateurs will always be smarter than a few experts collected in an elite star chamber; that Wikipedia will always move more quickly than the Encyclopaedia Britannica; that the country’s thousand-odd political bloggers will always spot news trends more quickly than slow-moving journalists in the mainstream media.
In three meetings a day, the officials assess all the intel that has risen to their attention — and they jointly decide what the nation’s most serious threats are.
The grass roots, they’ve found, are good at collecting threats but not necessarily at analyzing them. If a lot of low-level analysts are pointing to the same inaccurate posting, that doesn’t make it any less wrong.
Without the knowledge that comes from long experience, he added, a fledgling analyst or spy cannot know what is important or not. The counterterrorism center, he said, should decide which threats warrant attention.
Many of the officials at the very top, like Fingar, Meyerrose and their colleagues at the office of the director of national intelligence, are intrigued by the potential of a freewheeling, smart-mobbing intelligence community. The newest, youngest analysts are in favor of it, too. The resistance comes from the “iron majors” — career officers who occupy the enormous middle bureaucracy of the spy agencies. They might find the idea of an empowered grass roots to be foolhardy; they might also worry that it threatens their turf.
The normal case for social software is failure,” Shirky said. And because Intellipedia is now a high-profile experiment with many skeptics, its failure could permanently doom these sorts of collaborative spy endeavors.
It might be difficult to measure contributions to a wiki; if a brilliant piece of analysis emerges from the mob, who gets credit for it?
“A C.I.A. officer’s career is advanced by producing reports,”
Though D.N.I. officials say they have direct procurement authority over technology for all the agencies, there’s no evidence yet that Meyerrose will be able to make a serious impact on the eight spy agencies in the Department of Defense, which has its own annual $38 billion intelligence budget — the lion’s share of all the money the government spends on spying.
if the spies do not join the rest of the world, they risk growing to resemble the rigid, unchanging bureaucracy that they once confronted during the cold war.
Article du NY Times qui décrit en détail le projet Intellipedia, avantages, inconvénients,.... Très intéressant pour l'étude de cas de déploiement d'un projet 2.0. les risques et écueils ne sont pas oubliés. D'autant plus utile que c'est sans doute l'un des plus anciens projets de grande envergure de ce type actuellement. 10 pages.
Comme pour toute transformation d’entreprise, ils sont les principaux relais de la direction. Ils sont donc le passage obligé de tout changement et ont un rôle crucial dans l’échec ou la réussite d’un projet de transformation.
Cela ne signifie pas forcément qu’il y a une évolution des compétences dont ils vont avoir besoin, mais leur posture va changer. Ils devront endosser un rôle d’animateur, permettre à l’équipe de collaborer et de s’organiser. Leur rôle est moins hiérarchique, c’est plus une question de leadership et de management transverse.
A l’inverse ils seront les premiers à faire frein si on ne leur donne pas de possibilités d’évoluer. Ce sont à la fois les plus impactés et ceux qui vont conduire le changement. Les middle managers sont des acteurs clés.
Si on leur demande de travailler au delà de leur département sans que les règles d’évaluation n’aient été changées, il peut y avoir une certaine réticence de la part de leur manager. Donc il faut changer les règles de jeu au niveau du haut de la pyramide. Il ne faut plus noter seulement sur la performance individuelle mais sur le collaboratif.
Souvent ce sont des gens de la génération X, contrairement aux idées reçues qui veulent que la génération Y soit forcément championne du collaboratif. Ce sont eux qui vont rendre l’adoption plus facile dans le reste de l’entreprise. Il y a aussi un effet viral.
Right now, your company has 21st-century Internet-enabled business processes, mid-20th-century management processes, all built atop 19th-century management principles. (Gary Hamel – The Future Of Management)
Cette étude visait à démontrer que la culture d’entreprise ne pouvait pas être la même dans toutes les filiales car elle ne faisait nullement disparaître la culture nationale ; dans le meilleur des cas, elle se juxtaposait à elle.
Dans le cadre de cette étude, Hofstede mesure les distances hiérarchiques des différentes filiales. Pour un indice médian de 57, il mesure des distances hiérarchiques faibles dans les pays scandinaves (moins de 31) et anglo-saxons (moins de 40) et élevé en France (68).
Dans cette même étude, Hofstede mesure le contrôle d’incertitude.Le contrôle faible suppose davantage d’acceptation des situations comme ambiguës, réversibles dans leurs malheurs et leurs bonheurs. Les personnes sont acceptées comme pouvant changer d’humeur et de décision. Le contrôle fort veut s’appuyer sur des bases assurées qui peuvent aller de précautions concrètes à des précautions juridiques voire religieuses. Le contrôle fort est très en rapport avec le développement de la culture scientifique et techniqueEncore une fois, la France se classe en haut du tableau avec un contrôle fort de l’incertitude (un score de 86) tandis que les pays anglo-saxons ou nordiques affichent des résultats faibles attestant d’un contrôle faible de l’incertitude.
la primauté de la hiérarchie va à l’encontre des valeurs ayant emergé de la culture collaborative internet
Depuis au moins dix ans, la France est en retard sur les principaux pays de l’OCDE en matière de développement du télétravail (notamment dans l’administration), quelles que soient les sources ou les approches statistiques. Dans les pays scandinaves et anglo-saxons notamment, il concerne deux à trois fois plus de salariés.
ce détail a un coût. Cisco a ainsi publié un rapport intitulé the The Economics of Collaboration, et dans lequel l’entreprise explique comment en mettant en oeuvre des outils collaboratifs et en facilitant la mobilité des employés avec entre autres une démocratisation du télétravail, celle-ci a obtenu des résultats étonnants :
Cisco IBSG analysis shows that Cisco realized net benefits of $691 million/year through its Web 2.0 and visual collaboration investments in FY08. (…) These benefits represent a 4.9 percent productivity increase for Cisco. We believe this is just the beginning of the value creation we will see around the new collaborative web.
These solutions achieve their remarkable benefits by removing the costs and inefficiencies with which our employees have been struggling. Eliminating these inefficiencies not only brings financial benefits to the company; it also increases employees’ work/life balance, reduces stress and fatigue from extensive travel, and increases job satisfaction.
Un des éléments nécessaires au succès était le contexte, une dimension largement moins facile à importer que la technologie elle-même.
Pour la première fois l’appropriation technologique que l’entreprise pratiquait jusque là avec succès devait se doubler d’une appropriation comportementale. Un challenge d’autant plus difficile que les personnes en charge de l’un ne sont pas celles en charge de l’autre et que les fameux “usages” inquiétaient à juste titre : il fallait de plus les professionnaliser.
La professionalisation des usages est possible mais encore difficile à comprendre pour l’entreprise qui a besoin de quelque chose de plus structurant pour avancer. Ce qui amène à penser que la prochaine étape sera davantagé liée aux processus opérationnels.
Et dans l’entreprise utilisation signifie production et gains de productivité.
Le “web en tant que plateforme” au sein de l’entreprise va servir à enrichir les processus existants et donner de l’autonomie au collaborateur pour atteindre ses objectifs dans une entreprise en réseau.
Il n’est plus question ici d’importer des technologies mais de construire des “services” répondant à des besoins organisationnels. Cela peut sembler complexe mais c’est en fait plus compréhensible pour l’entreprise car se rapproche de logiques d’organisation de production qui lui sont plus familières que les logiques d’usage. Par services j’entend des couples “outils / mode de travail”
Un alignement des outils doit donc également être mis en place. Le collaborateur ne peut passer sa vie à servir de gare de triage entre les flux des outils internes, des outils utilisés avec clients et partenaires et des outils permettant de communiquer avec le monde au sens large.
En fait la qualité de l’adoption du web dans une entreprise dépend quasi exclusivement de la capacité de celle-ci à penser conjointement l’évolution de la technologie, des modes de travail et des rapports de l’entreprise à son ecosystème.
La preuve que finalement le web en tant que tel n’a aucune importance : il arrive naturellement dans tout projet d’entreprise bien pensé, s’appuyant sur une vraie vision.
Finalement beaucoup de débats actuels sont liés à la capacité de l'entreprise à comprendre, apprivoiser et utiliser le web à son profit, en interne. Un sujet a priori anodin puisque purement technologique et nécessitant des compétences autrement plus simples que celles mises en œuvres jusque là sur les infrastructures d'entreprise. Mais au final un sujet pas si anodin que cela.
But for most of us to really get strategic value from social business, we'll need to understand the ground rules. In other words, let's ask and answer the tough questions in making this transition:
Are social business activities generally better than non-social business activities?
How does having a social business help the bottom line and the long-term health of an organization?
What, in the end, does "taking a business social" really mean?
the network (the Web or enterprise or both) is about who is on it and how involved they are.
the transition to social business is about involving and engaging people far more than it is about picking a technology or building the infrastructure.
There is no simpler or more effective way to build the connections and your social business fabric than creating conversation.
But sitting back and waiting for the world to involve your business in what they do is just no longer an option. Too often, they will just go off to the communities that have already engaged them and that will be that. "Experience share" is your new measure of success, meaning the amount of time that the world interacts with you socially.
As I said then, "communities exist to serve the needs of their members" and themselves second if they intend to have a successful long-term relationship, as in most human relationships.
Social business doesn't mean we throw open the doors to everything automatically as a public process either. But we are usually so far in the other direction that a step towards this is just the right medicine right now.
Social analytics, however, are already here and this story is about individuals anyway. If workers aren't measured by how effective they are at creating value on the network, they will just focus on what they are measured on to get their recognition, raises, and promotions. This is a complex subject that will often have very different ground rules for different organizations.
Do not use social channels for traditional push communication. Classic examples: Don't use online communities for distributing press releases, product literature, PR, or spokesperson canned messages.
Censorship kills participation. Nothing will stop a social business in its tracks faster than inappropriate censorship.
But nothing will remove you from the world of social businesses faster or more effectively. Honest, open conversation is always the better choice and is truly valuable in its own right. Respond to criticism constructively and quickly.
If you are working closely with customers, partners, employees using social tools (as well as people are potentially want to be in one of those three groups) the more you do it, the more it will seem as if there is one cohesive community.
Where one gets a paycheck and what organization's name is on a business card is less important than the fact that everyone is getting more value than if they were doing things in a non-social way.
Everyone involved in a social relationship must get something out of it or there's no reason for it.
Being social for it's own sake may generate downstream value accidentally but social businesses will often have a long list of intentional reasons they are being social.
There are almost certainly a lot more rules for social businesses, but we're still learning them.
14 per cent use it at some time to access social networking sites. Usage is significantly higher among younger workers with 32 per cent of 16-24 year olds and 23 per cent of 25-34 year olds reporting frequent or occasional use.
20 per cent said their employer blocked access to social networking sites while 57 per cent said their employer allowed it (23 per cent did not know).
76 per cent of workers who use the Internet at work could see a benefit to their organisation in allowing access to social networking sites believing it showed:
- trust in employees (68 per cent);
- gave people a break from day to day work and kept them fresh (48 per cent); and
- allowed them to better network with other employees, customers and suppliers (40 per cent).
Among those who use social networking sites, 91 per cent saw a benefit to their organisation from the activity. In general, younger workers were more likely to see these benefits than their older counterparts.
16 per cent overall said an employer’s policy re on-line social networking would influence their decision to join one employer over another. This view was particularly strong among 16 to 24 year olds, with one in four saying it would.
91 per cent say that they use the Internet appropriately at work, with only 1 per cent admitting to frequent inappropriate use.